We address the programmatic realization of the access control model of security in distributed systems. Our aim is to bridge the gap between abstract/declarative policies and their concrete/operational implementations.
Introduction
This paper focuses on the programmatic realization of the access control model of security [31] in a distributed system. In this model, each object has a reference monitor that mediates requests from a subject: the authorization policy of the object determines whether subject requests are granted.
In a distributed system, it is unreasonable to assume global control of the trust relationships in the system. Rather, each party in the system maintains its own beliefs about trust relationships [13] . The resulting network of trust can be complex, even under the assumption of perfect authentication. For example, subtle notions of delegation must be expressed. Logic-based policy languages are particularly effective at capturing these subtleties. Notable examples have been derived from fragments of many-sorted first-order predicate logic, with sorts for roles and time [27] , and from fragments of intuitionist modal logic [2, 24] . In each case, suitable restrictions must be made to enable compilation to an efficient execution engine, such as Datalog.
There is often only an informal relationship between abstract (often declarative) policies and their concrete (often imperative) implementations. To illustrate this, consider protocols developed in the context of identity frameworks such as the Liberty Alliance [1] . These include protocols for federating identities (associating multiple accounts for a given Principal) and for Single Sign On (SSO) (using a federated network identity). It is attractive to implement these protocols using widely available programmatic authorization systems (such as Java Authentication and Authorization Service and .NET) where the required access checks are typically commingled with other aspects of code. Such commingling complicates arguments of correctness: we would like to know that the protocol implementation realizes its declarative specification (e.g., that SSO credentials are not used outside of some declared extent). More generally, one is interested in ensuring that the code realizing web-services in such a setting conforms with applicationspecific policies on creating, using, and updating identities.
We study programmatic implementations of authorization policies in a distributed system, viewing policies as part of the interface specification. We describe static analysis methods to tie the code of a component to its interface, to realize our goal of determining if a system satisfies a given policy.
to send and receive names along communication channels, which are themselves names. Since the pi-calculus supports name generation and name passing, it can describe dynamic network topologies.
To this basic setting, we add a notion of principal. Every pi process is associated with a principal. Inspired by related prior work on locations [8, 28] , we sometimes say that the code is located at a principal. Each principal has its own local notion of trust [37] . Following the security literature, we model these local beliefs as a security lattice of principals-a principal is (locally) more trustworthy if it is lower in the security lattice. Each local security lattice also provides a (local) interpretation of the constructions of compound principals. In concordance with the distributed context, we do not demand global consistency of local security lattices. The code located at a principal executes in the context of the trust lattice of the principal, using the local trust lattice to answer questions about the local ordering of principals in the trust lattice. The local security lattice evolves dynamically and monotonically, adding new principals and order relations during execution.
We eschew the standard "network is the opponent model" and assume that our messages have integrity, i.e., we are able to identify the sender of messages 1 . We do not address secrecy. This model is well established in the literature [30, 42, 5, 32] . By assuming integrity, we may focus on issues and attacks related directly to authorization, rather than the underlying cryptographic protocols.
Our computational model distinguishes three kinds of messages from a principal A. First, messages may be created from scratch by A -a receiver of the message can detect that the sender is A. Second, messages may be created by a distinct principal B and subsequently be forwarded by A -a receiver of the message can establish that the message from B is coming through unchanged, but via intermediary A. Third, messages may be created by A with an explicit tag, claiming to be from B -a receiver of the message can establish that A claims, without evidence, that the message is from B. The relative trust assigned to these different kinds of message is determined by local policies at the receiver, based on the receivers view of A and B. Principals may also create composite objects whose components are of different kinds.
Our formal treatment uses a sub-calculus of the calculus of compound principals [2, 3] to represent principals. Differences with standard presentations are justified by implementation concerns, which we discuss below.
Statics. We view specifications as annotations to be checked statically: they have no effect on the execu-tion of programs. Our formal development has two ingredients, following [22] : (a) Datalog extended to incorporate authorization logics, and (b) Code annotations to enforce temporal properties.
Recall that a Datalog program is a finite set of Horn clauses, without function symbols. We adapt Datalog to intuitionist authorization logics, permitting predicates to be modified by the modalities of the authorization logic. Intuitively, we associate the principal with each predicate, indicating that the principal uttered the predicate. An important predicate is that which encodes the local trust lattices. Following authorization logics, we use distinct modalities to represent the beliefs of distinct principals, which may be compound. Our technical results reduce the execution of Datalog programs over authorization logics to the execution of regular Datalog programs. This demonstrates the efficient decidability of the properties that are required for static-analysis (e.g., whether a clause can be inferred from a program).
Extended Datalog programs over authorization logics do not encode temporal notions. For example, in SSO, one must determine if an authentication event has happened before a given request. To remedy this inadequacy, we follow [22] in incorporating statements and expectations as static annotations of programs. One can view these annotations as correspondence assertions [43] , adapted to conjoin specifications of concurrent systems [6] . A statement is the analogue of the "assume" in usual program reasoning. It can be used either to record an assertion of global policy or to state assertions about a specific control point. An expectation is the analogue of "guarantee" in usual program reasoning. It is a falsifiable claim that a clause is a logical consequence of the current database of assertions.
Our static analysis falls into two categories: typechecking and model-checking.
We provide a type-and-effect system for our programming calculus, where the extended Datalog programs are used as effects. Typing a program establishes two properties. First, in a well-typed program every "expectation" is met. Second, the Datalog specification at any principal of a well-typed program provides a static upper-bound on the local trust lattice, i.e., if the specification does not permit principal A to be ordered below principal B, then A will not be below B in any execution of the program. In the SSO example, this permits us to conclude that the implementation does not provide more rights than those permitted by the policy. We prove robust safety, indicating that well-typed programs are safe in the face of arbitrary untyped opponent processes.
We provide a model-checking framework for a subset of programs by translating (a fragment of) our programming calculus into a version of the pi-calculus amenable to model-checking [7] . The fragment requires a fixed finite number of principals, in addition to restrictions on pi processes imposed by [7] . Specifically, [7] requires that each channel have a unique receiver and satisfy linearity restrictions, thus ensuring bounds on the use of generated names. In the SSO example, this permits us to conclude that the implementation does indeed provide the rights that are permitted by the policy. This is a liveness property, which complements the safety properties guaranteed by the type system.
Related Work
Authorization logics [3, 2, 24, 23] are the basic foundations of this paper. Our work particularly builds on compound principals and their use for distributed authentication frameworks [42, 30] . Our treatment complements this prior research by focussing on relating implementations to interfaces that specify properties in these logics. More speculatively, our work can be viewed as the first step towards exploring the programming combinators that are suggested by the type language of authorization logic over compound principals.
Our approach to assume-guarantee reasoning is inspired by recent work on types for authorization [22] . In [22] , there is no explicit notion of identity, and thus authorization is viewed as a cryptographic protocol in the context of the traditional "network is the opponent" model. As a reader of both papers will recognize immediately, we shamelessly incorporate their presentation idioms and technical methods, albeit for a rather different programming model and specification formalism.
Binder [20] is a Datalog formalism that works over authorization logics that is restricted to simple principals. We adapt these techniques to permit compound principals and yet ensure (effective) computability by imposing additional axioms on the basic operation of "quoting" on trust lattices. One can view these extra axioms as reducing the redundancy between the lattice of principals and the proof theory supported by authorization logics. On the other hand, these extra axioms reduce the expressiveness of the calculus of compound principals.
In this area, restrictions of first-order logic that ensure effective computability of specification logics have been well-explored. Our sampling of these references is perforce highly incomplete -the delegation logic [33] and RT framework [34] approach to trust-management, Binder [20] and compositional approaches to access-control [14, 40, 41] that compile down to logic programs fall into this general category. SecPAL [9] is a recent and expressive innovation that belongs in this overall research program. Generally, the focus of this line of work is specification. We focus on the complementary relationship between a given specification and a concrete implementation.
Access control in mobile process languages has been explored in a variety of settings -we consider a sampling of some of these papers. [16] explores mandatory access control in boxed ambients. Klaim (see [11] for a survey) is a Linda-tuple based programming model with a notion of named locations with access control policies that specify the capabilities of the location. A similar approach is taken in [28, 37, 36] . [15] and [19] explore role-based access control in the context of mobile process calculi. These calculi have primitives to activate and deactivate roles: these roles are used to prevent undesired mobility and/or communication. Our formal setting is similar to that of [15] , where the "locality" of a process is the name of the principal (or role) on whose behalf the process acts. This style of presentation is only loosely related to other notions of locality in process calculi (see [17] for an extensive survey).
In contrast to this line of work, this paper emphasizes compound principals in dynamics and specifications. Furthermore, the type systems of the above papers are intentionally less general than our specifications, which incorporate general authorization policies.
The use of static analysis techniques to verify security properties is by now well-established, e.g., logicprogramming based methods for security protocols [12] . Model-checking methods have been explored for access control in domain specific languages (e.g., [25, 44] ) and in the context of systems such as SELinux [26, 29] . We use model-checking methods explored for mobile calculi -see [21] for a survey. We directly use the results of [7] , which identify a fragment of the pi-calculus that is amenable to deciding the control-reachability problem: i.e., is a certain control point reachable in any execution of a program?
Limitations and Future work. The history and state sensitive aspects of access control are now well-accepted; see [4] , temporal extensions to RBAC [10] , state-transition approaches to trust management [18] , and usage control systems [45] . Our paper treats temporality in the specifications indirectly via the relative placement statements and expectations in code. In future work, we will explore the incorporation of temporal connectives [35] in the specification logic.
This paper provides only a very weak approximation to revocation via garbage collection of unusable names. In future work, we will explore the incorporation of quantitative notions of time to enable the accurate description of leases, which facilitate revocation in distributed computing.
Organization of this paper The following section presents the dynamics of the language, which Section 3 illustrates through the SSO example. This is followed by a description of the typing system in Section 4, revisiting the SSO example. Section 5 describes model checking. A longer version of this paper is available at http://www.teasp.org/daisy.
Syntax and Evaluation
This section describes the operational semantics of Daisy. We first describe the properties expected of the calculus of compound principals. We then describe terms, local security orders, and processes.
Calculus of Compound Principals
The local security order at every principal supports a calculus of compound principals. For a detailed treatment of the intuitions underlying compound principals, we refer to the original sources [3, 42, 30] .
Atomic principals a, b, c are used to identify code. Nonatomic principals A, B, C occur in policies and in terms but do not identify code. Following [2, 3] , conjunction "∧" is a meet in the lattice of principals; the quotation operator "|" is associative, in addition to being monotone and multiplicative in each argument.
The lattice ordering A ⇒ B indicates that A is more trustworthy than B. Following standard equational presentations of lattices, one may think of A ⇒ B as shorthand for the equality of A ∧ B and A. Thus 0 is the most trustworthy principal, 1 the least, and A ∧ B is the least trustworthy principal that is more trustworthy than both A and B. (Papers emphasizing secrecy often use the dual ordering.) The (nonatomic) principal del is used to encode delegation.
We additionally take quotation (|) to be commutative, idempotent and extensive. Further, we identify the speaksfor relation with the lattice order; thus "⇒" can be read as "speaks-for". These extra axioms facilitate the finiteness principle of Remark 1. For further discussion, see Section 4.1. The following axioms define the principal order, where ⇔ is used to abbreviate bidirectional axioms.
From these axioms one can derive that ∧ and | are monotone in ⇒. We use the following abbreviation [3] .
for is reflexive, monotone in both arguments, and preserves more trust than quotation (|). The original source (B) is always more trustworthy than a delegated source (A for B); however, delegation via 0 does not decrease trust.
Some Derived Facts
For any finite lattice L of atomic principals, there is a finite lattice of principals that interprets the quoting combinator freely, such that the only equations that hold are those induced by L and the entailment axioms given above. (We elide the standard formalization as a free construction in the vocabulary of category theory.) The proof follows the observation that the the axioms on the quoting combinator coincide with those of the Hoare powerdomain [38] . We sketch the proof here. Define a partial order with carrier as the set of all finite subsets of L . View a finite subset, say {A 1 , . . . , A n }, as standing for
This is a complete lattice with the quoting combinator interpreted as union and conjunction given by
Terms
We describe the vocabulary of terms, which represent the values that can be created and sent during computation.
Value, Source
Terms include pi-calculus names, variables and principals. Names are used as labels and as communication channels. We use for names used a labels and n-m for names used as channels.
Tuples N( M) are labeled by a name N. Tuple labels are used in matching; for example, the term (M,N) matches the pattern (x,y).
The signature term sig A(M) represents a term with integrity: the origin is guaranteed to be the principal A. One can imagine the straightforward use of digital signature schemes to efficiently realize this abstraction; our notation acknowledges this potential implementation. The term tag A(M) on the other hand is a term whose putative origin is A: the trust placed in this term depends on the application context.
The term M.val indicate the value of M, ignoring signatures and tags, whereas M.src indicates the source of M, ignoring its value. val can be used to forget the provenance of a term, as for example in an anonymizer. We treat terms up to an equational algebra on val and src.
Term Algebra
Note that if M is a name, principal or tuple then M.val = M and M.src = 0. For variables we have x.val = x and x.src = x.src; the source of a variable cannot be simplified. Further note that M.src.val = M.src, for any term M. Also M.val.src = 0, for any non-variable term M.
The terms sig B(sig A(n)) and sig B(tag A(n)) are both signed by B. The first is forwarded from B, whereas the second is tagged by A. Both equal n under val; however, src distinguishes them. Because 0 is a left zero of for and |, we have
In this way, the provenance of the quoted message can be established.
The lattice axioms prove that
. Consider a message sig B(n) sent by A. The reference implementation of sig using digital signatures clearly satisfies A | B, since the message is coming from A quoting B. It also satisfies B since the digital signature vouchsafes for B. Thus, the reference implementation of sig is sound with respect to trustworthiness.
Local Security Order
The ordering of principals can vary from site to site. The calculus of compound principals (Section 2.1) is lifted to terms to define a local security order at each atomic principal. A collection of formulas, a< s>, reflects the policies and acquired beliefs of atomic principal a, where each s i is an order formula M ⇒ N. Order formulas may include variables and are thus subject to (untyped) substitution. 
Order Formulas and Entailment
s,t ::= M ⇒ N s A ⇒ B if A ⇒ B s A ∧ A ⇒ B ∧ B if s A ⇒ B and s A ⇒ B s A | A ⇒ B | B if s A ⇒ B and s A ⇒ B s M ⇒ M s M ⇒ N if s M ⇒ L and s L ⇒ N s M ⇒ N if (M ⇒ N ) ∈ s and M .val = M and N .val = N s M ⇒ N if M.val = M
Processes and Configurations
The basic entity of computation is a process, or thread.
Processes

Z
Process Variables
We observe the normal scope rules for pi calculi 2 .
Definition 2. We write fn(P) for the set of free names, variables and atomic principal in P, and similarly for other syntactic categories. Write P{x := M} for the capture avoiding substitution of M for x in P. As usual, we identify syntax up to renaming, drop types when uninteresting, and assume that occurrences of process variables are guarded by input.2
Threads incorporate primitives from the asynchronous pi-calculus with pairs. These include composition, recursion, restriction, output, input, and match. The match construct is blocking. Computation of "match M as ( x).P" proceeds if M is a tuple of arity | x| labeled with ; for example, (n,m) matches (x,y), but fails to match n(x,y) or (x).
The learn primitive adds information to the local security order, which the check primitive may query.
Correspondences are used in the type system, as discussed in Section 4; they have no effect on dynamics and thus will be ignored for the rest of this section.
Running processes are collected into configurations.
Located Process a< s> Located Security Lattice
Composition and restriction in the configuration language are related to the analogous constructs in the process language by structural rules, discussed below.
Each thread a[P] of a configuration is located at a unique atomic principal a. Any number of threads may be located at the same atomic principal.
Each atomic principal has an associated local security order a< s>. The check and learn primitives operate on this local order. As stated before, the security orders of different principals are unrelated. We assume that each atomic principal has at most one local order.
Definition 3.
A configuration is well-formed if it contains at most one trust lattice a< s> for each atomic principal a. 2
In the sequel, we assume that all configurations are wellformed. To make use of learn and check, an atomic principal must therefore have exactly one local security order.
Initial configurations may contain any number of tags; however, sigs are generated at runtime.
This initiality restriction mirrors initial key distribution conditions in the formal analysis of cryptographic protocols. It ensures that signatures are unforgeable.
Evaluation
Structural equivalence relates configurations that differ only in the order of static combinators.
In addition to the standard properties of | and new (monoid laws, extrusion, garbage collection), the structural rules relate static combinators of the process language to those of the configuration language. For example,
The structural rule for new principals establishes a local security order for the new principal, preserving wellformedness and enabling it to use learn and check. The local lattice states that the new principal believes that its parent is at least as trustworthy as itself. (Because the new principal itself states this, it becomes a globally acknowledged fact-see Remark 11 .)
The evaluation rules describe the evolution of configurations over time.
if M.src = B, and M.val = ( N), and
The rule for communication is notable in two respects. First, the source of channel names is ignored; that is, channel names are considered modulo val. Thus,
with a suitable substitution. Second, the source of a message is recorded in the recipient. Thus, the substitution generated by preceding example is b[P{x := sig a(M)}]. The source (in this case a) is unforgeably recorded in the receiving process. As initial configurations (Definition 4) evaluate, terms carry sigs to indicate their provenance.
The evaluation rule for match M as ( x) checks that the value of M is a tuple of arity | x| labeled with . If these conditions hold, then the match succeeds. In the consequent, the elements of the tuple are tagged with the source of M, so as not to lose the provenance of the data. The use of tag rather than sig for this purpose is motivated by the reference implementation in terms of digital signatures -A cannot in general create sig B(). This is further discussed in Remark 5.
The learn and check primitives allow interaction between a thread and the local security order. learn is used to add new order relations, monotonically, to the local order. check is used to query the local order dynamically.
Remark 5. If sig a(N)
Remark 6 (Conventions). In many cases, the label on a tuple is uninteresting. We therefore presuppose a set of standard labels zero, one, two, etc, indicating the cardinality of the tuple. We elide these standard labels in both terms and patterns, writing simply "(M,N)" rather than "two(M,N)". We also use the following abbreviations.
In multiline programs, write |P|Q for P|Q. We use sans serif in examples, to distinguish variables from metavariables (which appear in italics); keywords are written in boldface. 2
Encoding Single Sign On (SSO)
We consider the following simplified use case from SSO: a user process running as principal uid is attempting to access a protected resource res at a service provider running as sp. We will adopt the policy that only members of institution inst may access res.
Since this is an SSO protocol, uid is asked to establish its identity only if it is unknown already. In the case that sp grants access after the initial request from uid, the message sequence is as follows.
uid −→ sp : sp-req!(new yes,new no) uid ←− sp : yes! . . . access to res granted uid sends a a request to sp on channel sp-req, passing two new continuation channels. If a response is heard on the first of these continuations then the operation was successful and access to res has been granted.
In the case that sp initially refuses access, uid contacts srv to get a certificate vouching for its identity. uid then forwards the certificate to sp and retries its initial request.
The certificate indicates that the server believes that uid belongs to institution inst. In this example, however, the server signs the certificate as srv | ip, indicating that srv does not itself vouch for the claim, but rather is quoting another identity provided ip. In order to provide access, sp must believe that certificates forwarded from srv | ip may speak as authorized identity providers.
In this case, successful access proceeds as follows. After the initial refusal by sp, uid sends a request to srv on ip-req with continuation channel c, and srv replies with a certificate. Crucial here is the form of the certificate created by srv: this is a pair (uid,inst) labeled by okcert. The label is used to communicate the intent of the certificate via types, as discussed in Section 4.4; we ignore it here. Before sending the certificate, srv tags it by ip, indicating its qualified endorsement of the claims therein. As per the definition of evaluation, the certificate received and then forwarded by uid is signed by srv. Thus, the message received by sp on sp-auth has the form sig uid( sig srv(tag ip(okcert(uid,inst)))
Forwarded from srv , . . . ) sp accepts the certificate, notifying uid on the yes continuation, at which point uid repeats its initial request, which is now granted.
With this introduction, we now describe the implementation, narrating the second use case above. The user configuration has the following form. If the initial request to sp on sp-req fails, then the user issues a certificate request on ip-req and forwards the result to sp on sp-auth. If the certificate is accepted, then the user repeats its initial request on sp-req via loop. (For simplicity, we have written the code assuming that ip-req is always granted.)
We now present the code running at sp and srv, starting with the local security order at sp.
In the example execution, sp initially believes that members of inst may access res, and that certificates from srv | ip are authorized to provide identity information for inst, even when forwarded via an unknown sequence of intermediaries. A proof that this policy achieves the desired effect follows from the monotonicity and semi-associativity of for.
(Although we treat this as the initial policy of sp, such policies may be built dynamically following the techniques discussed in this example.)
The code servicing sp-req is as follows.
sp[*sp-req?x. match x as (yes,no). check x.src ⇒ res then yes! else no!]
After receiving the message from uid, x is bound to sig uid(yes,no), and thus x.src is (equivalent to) uid.
With only the initial facts, i.e., the user has not been validated earlier, the test uid ⇒ res fails. At this point, uid contacts srv on ip-req to get a certificate that will prove its identity to sp. The local policy and code for srv are as follows.
After receiving the message from uid, x is bound to sig uid(c), and thus x.src is uid. Since srv believes that uid belongs to inst, it replies with a certificate that it is willing to sign as srv | ip. uid now forwards the certificate from srv to sp on sp-auth. The message is received as follows.
sp[*sp-auth?x. match x as (cert,yes,no). check cert.src ⇒ authorized-ip then match cert as okcert(z uid ,z inst ).
After receiving the message from uid and performing the match, cert is bound to tag uid(sig srv(tag ip(okcert(uid,inst)))) and thus cert.src is uidfor (srv | ip). Recall that the local policy of sp specifies that 1 for (srv | ip)⇒ authorized-ip. Therefore the check cert.src ⇒ authorized-ip succeeds. The contents of the certificate are then recovered using match, and added to the local order of sp using learn. Subsequent requests from uid on sp-req will grant access to res.
Remark 7.
It is worth noting that correspondence between the check (x.src ⇒ inst) in ip-req and the learn (z uid ⇒ z inst ) in sp-auth is entirely programmatic, and therefore prone to error. The type system makes explicit such implicit correspondences, eliminating potential programming errors. 2
Full identity-management protocols permit variations in the flow of information. For example, the certificate may be sent directly from srv to sp. This can be accommodated in our example by simple changes to the code for uid and srv, without modifying the local orders. Interestingly, we can force such a change by modifying the local policy of sp to:
This forces the protocol to directly communicate the authorization token from srv to sp.
Types
We present a type-and-effect system where effects are extended Datalog programs. Our formal presentation closely follows [22] . We begin this section with a review of the underlying authorization logic and an extended Datalog built on top of authorization logic. Next, we discuss the typing system and illustrate with code fragments drawn from the SSO example.
Background: Authorization Logics
We refer the reader to [24, 2] for the intuitions underlying authorization logics. Our presentation satisfies more commutativity properties than [24] in the proof theory. In comparison to [2] , we have no second-order quantifiers.
The formulas are given by the following grammar: for expository purposes, we only consider conjunction & and implication .
A says α connects the calculus of principals to the logic: this is the quoting combinator of the logic and is related to the quoting combinator of the lattice by defining A | B says α to be A says B says α.
We describe Hilbert-style axioms to describe the tautologies. We first define B-protected formulas [2, 39] . Informally, if there is a proof of a B-protected formula, then there is one that does not require statements of principals that are more trustworthy than B. In concordance with the informal intuitions, the following axiom system satisfies the property that if a formula is Bprotected and A ⇒ B, then the formula is also A-protected. The above remarks are motivated by finiteness considerations (Remark 1), although they do reduce the expressiveness of the calculus of principals.
Extended Datalog
We describe the syntax and semantics of a variant of Datalog extended to work over the authorization logic. As with regular Datalog, a program will be built from a set of Horn clauses without function symbols. In contrast to regular Datalog, the literals are in the form of quotes of principals. Despite this extra generality, the extended formalism has decidable clause inference. We establish this by a translation of extended Datalog into Datalog.
Syntax of Extended Datalog
Extended Datalog terms include variables and terms from the underlying process calculus.
Clauses in extended Datalog are a subset of the language presented in Section 4.1. We write the predicate ⇒ infix as in a says B ⇒C (or a says s) and define A-protected clauses as follows.
For example, the clause (u says v ⇒ w) :-K is A-protected if A ⇒ u or A ⇒ w.
Definition 13. We define nested uses of says as a metaoperation using compound principals: u says (v says p( w))
The following example is a variant of one presented in [20] . It illustrates the kind of distributed policy that can be represented in this language.
Example 14. Consider a company A. It is agreed globally that A is a subsidiary of A. It is also globally agreed that the employee of a subsidiary is also an employee of the parent company. A HR is the HR service of A. A HR believes that B is an employee of A . R con believes that all employees of A can access some resource R. As far as C is concerned, R con is the authority on access to R. We will deduce that C permits B to access R. This policy is encoded in the following extended Datalog program. 
Inference for Ground Literals
We comment on the relation between extended Datalog and the axioms for authorization logic of Definition 9. The first rule is the usual inference rule for Datalog, reflecting modus ponens. The lattice axiom is reflected in the next rule. The third rule reflects modality-unit, whereas the fourth reflects modality-mult.
Lemma 15. Let σ range over substitutions of variables x for terms M. Extended Datalog inference satisfies the following:
•
Translating into Regular Datalog. Consider an extended Datalog program C. In the full version of this paper, we adapt [20] to describe a translation of C into regular Datalog that is sound and complete for the inference of ground literals.
We sketch the key step in the construction, namely that L -the lattice of all the possible principals that can occur during execution of C -is finite. The generators of L includes all atomic principals occurring in C. It also includes a fresh "symbolic" atomic principal for each quoting-free program term that occurs in C, where program terms are considered up to equality in the term algebra. L is constructed using Remark 1 as the free interpretation of the quoting operation on the free ∧-semilattice on this set of generators. |L | is doubly exponential in the number of generators for C.
The translation yields a regular Datalog program C of size | C | ≤ O(|L | 2 + | C|). Thus we have a decision procedure for clause inference: Suppose that θ maps the free extended Datalog variables of
Types
We first sketch the goals of typing, which are formalized later. Recall that the syntax of processes (and therefore configurations) includes extended Datalog clauses (C) and expectations (expect C). The interpretation of a clause a[C] is modulated by the atomic principal a that utters it (using the meta-operation a says C).
An opponent is an untrustworthy atomic principal. Opponents may utter any clause and may have unreasonable expectations. We model opponents as principals equivalent to 1, the least trustworthy principal. We then require that 1 says α is valid for any α, and thus clauses of opponents are effectively ignored. In typing, we assume that all sets of extended Datalog clauses are closed with respect to this requirement, though we will often elide the necessary clauses in the interests of succinctness.
A configuration G has a runtime error if it contains an expectation that cannot be justified by the accumulated clauses of G (in addition to those statically defined). A configuration is safe if it has no runtime errors (and this property is preserved by evaluation). Our typing system ensures robust safety, that is, safety of typed configurations when combined with arbitrary opponents.
The typing system does not attempt to prevent representation errors, e.g., using a tuple as a channel. Thus the only nontrivial types are those for labels, which carry effects.
Types and Environments
The type Label( x) C represent a latent effect, labeled with a name. In this type, the variables x are bound in C. The match construct is required to unlock the label and expose the effects. For simplicity, we treat the enclosed elements x at type Un; it is straightforward to generalize the typing system to allow these to be label types as well.
All other terms are assigned type Un. The type system is designed to permit all opponents to circumvent checks by using Un.
Let identifiers η range over names and variables. Unlike [22] , the type associated with an identifier (η:T ) carries no meaningful information with respect to logical inference. Definition 16. Logical inference is lifted to environments (E C) simply by ignoring non-clauses in E. Let dom(E) be the domain E, including process variables, 2
In the composition G|H, assumptions in G may be discharged in H. The typing rules use env to collect the clauses in G, producing a suitable environment. This uses an auxiliary function env a which collects clauses defined in processes located at a. To simplify the definition, we assume (without loss of generality) that all names bound by new are distinct and fresh.
Env env a (C) = a says C env a (P|Q) = env(P), env(Q) env a (µZ.P) = env(P) env a (new n:T.P) = n:T , env(P) env a (new b with P) = b, env(P) env a (P) = ·, otherwise
Typing. We describe the rules for environments, terms, processes and configurations. An environment is well-typed if it binds all free names, variables and atomic principals in label types and clauses.
The rule for parallel composition should be viewed as a conjoining of specifications: each component can assume the exposed clauses of the other component. The rules for 0, recursive processes, new names, input and output are standard. Note that in the rule for new principals, the residual is typed at the new principal. In addition, new principals may make use of the fact that they are ordered below their parent.
As there are two rules for creating tuples, there are also two rules for matching them. The first rule allows honest processes to use the latent effect of the label when typing in the residual. Thus, the match construct can be viewed as a "dynamic cast" operation acting on an untyped message. The second rule allows matching in opponents.
The rule for learn demands static validation of modifications to the local security lattice. Since check is a conditional, the typing rule expands the environment in case that the check is satisfied.
The rule for clauses ensures syntactic validity. The first rule for expectations ensures derivability from the clauses in the environment. The second allows arbitrary expectations in opponents.
Each process in a configuration is typed at its locating principal. The rules for composition and restriction follow those for processes. The final rule ensures that each local order is consistent with the environment.
A typed program validates all learn and expect statements, even in the presence of opponents. The result relies on initiality (Definition 4), but not well-formedness.
Definition 17 (Runtime Error
Definition 18 (Opponent). An atomic principal a is an Eopponent principal if E 0 says 1 ⇒ a or a ∈ dom(E). An E-opponent configuration is a configuration a Theorem 20 (Robust Safety). If E G, then G is robustly E-safe.
As usual, the proof of robust safety depends on lemmas for opponent typability (if H is an initial E-opponent then E, E H, for some suitable E ) and type preservation (if E G and G → H then E H).
Typing the SSO Example
We describe how correspondences such as that discussed in Remark 7 can be statically checked. We start with the following static policy.
Conformance ensures that the local orders obey this static policy. This is true of the initial orders:
With respect to typing, the most significant fragment of sp is the following code servicing sp-auth.
In order to typecheck the learn, we must deduce
This is achieved by assigning okcert an appropriate type.
The type of okcert states that the sender of the tuple believes that the first enclosed principal dominates the second. The learn is then typed using assumptions:
sp says cert.src ⇒ authorized-ip . . . from check cert.src says z uid ⇒ z inst
. . . from match
Combined with the first clause of the static policy, this is sufficient to deduce ( * ). One may also annotate the learn with an explicit expectation, such as the following.
This can be typed under the same assumptions.
Having discussed the certificate's receiver, sp, we now turn attention to its creator, srv. The relevant code fragment is the following. check x.src ⇒ inst then x!(tag ip(okcert(x.src,inst)))]
In order to typecheck the output, we must deduce
The output is typed under the following assumption.
srv says x.src ⇒ inst . . . from check
Combining this with the static policy, ( †) follows from order naturality and the extensivity of |.
The static policy we started with is quite permissive, in that sp allows an authorized-ip to say anything at all. More realistically, we may restrict authorized-ip to speak only for inst by replacing the first line of the static policy with the following.
With this policy, however, the code servicing sp-auth does not typecheck. To correct the problem, we must add an additional check.
check cert.src ⇒ authorized-ip then match cert as okcert(z uid ,z inst ).
Then the learn is typed successfully under the additional assumption "sp says inst ⇒ z inst ". With a few modifications, one can establish the expectation "sp says uid ⇒ inst" after the input on yes 2 in uid; the user can determine that sp has the necessary information to grant access on a subsequent sp-req.
This does not, however, imply that sp has correspondingly updated its local order. Despite the validity of the expectation, subsequent requests may be denied. Type checking guarantees that all permitted accesses are justified; it does not, however, address the dual question of whether every permitted access is actually granted. For that, we turn to model checking.
Model Checking
We apply reachability analysis to Daisy programs to analyze the converse of the problem studied via typechecking: does a configuration incorporate order information entailed by the policy into local trust lattices? We outline our approach to model checking and the fragment of the language that can be analyzed, then sketch the translation used to reduce the reachability problem to an existing decidability result for reachability in a fragment of pi-calculus.
Analysis via Reachability. We can use reachability to encode interesting questions about SSO systems, building on Section 3.
Example 21 (Single Sign On Revisited). If a user of an SSO system has previously signed in, they expect to be granted access to a resource for which they are entitled. One may specify this by stating that certain states of a system are unreachable, e.g., the uid code from Section 3 might be modified to: The analysis tactic in Example 21 can be generalized to the converse of the problem addressed by typechecking, i.e., does a configuration incorporate order information entailed by the policy into local trust lattices? For example, for the SSO example of Section 3, does sp's local trust lattice entail uid ⇒ res whenever statements made by the configuration entail sp says uid ⇒ res? This approach allows us to move from the hand-crafted analysis in Example 21 to an analysis based upon the policy adopted for type checking. There may be a delay between deducibility of a statement (with respect to the combined global policy) and updates to a local trust order. In the absence of an additional temporal specification we adopt a late interpretation, verifying the completeness of the local trust order with respect to global deducibility at the point that a process performs a check.
Definition 22 (Complete
Below, we distinguish a bounded fragment of our language, dubbed Daisy B , for which completeness is decidable. All variants of the SSO example can be modified to conform to this fragment (in part by replacing parallel composition with internal choice).
Assuming that the static policy of Section 4.4 is included in the initial configuration, then sp says uid ⇒ res is immediately deducible from the global policy. We can verify that the SSO code of Example 21 is complete; e.g., when the check uid ⇒ res is executed in sp, it will succeed. In contrast, the original code of Section 3 is not complete; the initial service request from uid to sp (before login) will cause the check uid ⇒ res to fail. A Bounded Fragment and its Translation. The reachability problem is decidable for an expressive bounded fragment Daisy B of Daisy via translation to the expressive fragment of asynchronous polyadic pi-calculus for which reachability is shown to be decidable in [7] . The language of [7] includes parameterized process definitions with name generation but places two restrictions on process definitions: the bounded input condition (each process definition has exactly one continuation or ends with the internal choice between two continuations) and the unique receiver condition (there is at most one process that can receive input for each channel name). The source of the translation, Daisy B , is therefore also defined in terms of parameterized processes with the bounded input and unique receiver conditions. Daisy B also presumes a finite lattice of principals and a routine polyadic typing system (as opposed to the type-and-effect system of Section 4).
A parameterized process definition is either the internal choice of two parameterized processes, or has the form: Following [7] , the parameters x 1 are bound only to channel names, and y 1 must be chosen from this list. In addition, the names η 2 , η 4 must be chosen from x 1 or n 3 . Unlike [7] , the parameters x 2 may be bound not only to names, but more generally to terms. This allows terms to be carried into continuations without imposing additional communication, which would alter the source of the term. The operational semantics of Daisy B is obtained from that of Section 2 by modifying the structural rule for unfolding to operate on such declared names by performing an appropriate substitution into the body of the declaration.
Daisy B parameterized processes must typecheck using a routine polyadic type system. The type system keeps label names distinct from channel names. The form of process definitions precludes dynamic generation of new principals or names for labeled tuples, thus allowing name matching to be encoded in the target language.
As is the case for the target language, Daisy B is expressive. Trivial uses of clauses, match, learn, and check are easily written (e.g., learning an inequality that is already known). Sequential uses of multiple clauses, matches, learns, and checks can be encoded using multiple process definitions with continuations.
We require that ⇒ be the only predicate to occur in a clause of a Daisy B program. In conjunction with the finite lattice of principals, the collection of instantiations of clauses in this form is finite. This permits tracking the clauses stated by a configuration and checking that each principal's local trust lattice is consistent with these clauses.
The key ingredients of the translation from Daisy B to asynchronous polyadic pi-calculus are:
Name Matching: The elements of the finite lattice of principal names, and the names for labeled tuples, are translated to channel names. Internal choice is used to encode name matching, which suffices for reachability questions.
Runtime Principal Computations: Computation of a ∧ b and a | b takes place at runtime, which is possible because of principal name matching and the fact that the lattice is finite, so every case can be encoded into a server process that handles requests for these computations.
Labeled Tuples as Lists: A labeled tuple in a Daisy B process is transmitted as a list of names in the (polyadic pi-calculus) translation. The size corresponds to the number of leaves of the labeled tuple, i.e., the number of principal and channel names nested inside the labeled tuple.
Terms with Principal: The translation of a Daisy B term is also transmitted with a principal name computed at runtime from the combination of one or more sig/tag constructors. For example, the term sig A(sig B(m)) would be translated into two names: the first carrying the principal A for B and the second representing m.
Located Trust Lattices: A single process is created to store the current state of each principal's trust lattice and, if checking completeness (Definition 22), the collection of statements made by the configuration. Checks, learns, and statements in Daisy B are translated into a request-response dialogue with the process storing this information. Since the initial trust lattice is finite, both the set of inequations that can be learned by each principal, and the set of clauses that can be issued as statements, are finite. Therefore the process has finite state. The response of the process to execution of the translation of a Daisy B check is defined in terms of order entailment and clause inference. If clause inference establishes the inequation in a check, but the principal in question's current trust lattice does not entail the inequation, then a well-known end state is reached. Results. The translation extends from parameterized process definitions to configurations, and, critically, both preserves and reflects reachability of Daisy B parameterized processes. In conjunction with [7] , we obtain a decision procedure for reachability questions. 
Conclusions
Daisy falls into the broad area of language-based approaches to security, specifically access control. Our results bridge the gap between specifications (based on authorization logics) with implementations (based on programming with explicit identities).
We advance the technical state-of-the-art with three results: (a) robust safety for an asynchronous pi-calculus enriched with compound identities, (b) translation of a distributed authorization logic into Datalog, and (c) decidability for a suitable notion of completeness on a bounded fragment of our language.
